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Abstract
This paper develops and compares two theories of strategic behavior of profes-
sional forecasters. The first theory posits that forecasters compete in a forecasting
contest with pre-specified rules. In equilibrium of a winner-take-all contest, forecasts
are excessively diﬀerentiated. According to the alternative reputational cheap talk
theory, forecasters aim at convincing the market that they are well informed. The
market evaluates their forecasting talent on the basis of the forecasts and the real-
ized state. If the market expects forecaster honesty, forecasts are shaded toward the
prior mean. With correct market expectations, equilibrium forecasts are imprecise
but not shaded.
Keywords: Forecasting, contest, reputation, cheap talk.
JEL Classification: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D82 (Asymmetric and Private
Information), D83 (Search, Learning, and Information).
∗We thank Dean Croushore for essential feedback in the early stages of this project, Owen Lamont
for generously giving us the Business Week Investment Outlook data along with very useful suggestions,
Marco Battaglini for valuable discussion of the paper, Eric Zitzewitz for extremely helpful feedback,
Andrew Chesher, Christian Dustmann, Douglas Gale, Peter R. Hansen, Harrison Hong, Boyan Jovanovic,
Jon Levin, John Morgan, Kent Osband, Mike Peters, Ilya Segal, Daniel Seidmann, Hyun Shin, Gianluca
Violante, and Jeﬀrey Zwiebel for useful input, and seminar audiences at Aarhus, American Economic
Association (New Orleans), Bank of Italy, Bergen, Berlin, Bonn, Brussels, CEMFI (Madrid), Cambridge,
Copenhagen, Danish Economic Society 2000, European Economic Association (Stockholm), ENTER 2001
(Mannheim), Erice Conference on Stochastic Methods in Decision and Game Theory with Applications,
ESRC-PIPPS (Bristol), ESSET 2000 (Gerzensee), European Central Bank, EUI (Florence), Helsinki,
INSEAD, Koç University, LBS, LSE, Munich, NYU Stern School, Paris (Roy Seminaire), Pompeu Fabra,
Princeton, Royal Holloway, Southampton, Stanford, Surrey, and UCL for comments.
†Marco Ottaviani, Economics Subject Area, London Business School, Sussex Place, Regent’s Park,
London NW1 4SA, England. Phone: +44-20-7262-5050 ext. 3778. Fax: +44-20-7402-0718. E-mail:
mottaviani@london.edu. Web: http://faculty.london.edu/mottaviani/.
‡Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestræde 6, DK—1455 Copenhagen K, Den-
mark. Phone: +45—3532—3056. Fax: +45—3532—3000. E-mail: peter.sorensen@econ.ku.dk. Web:
http://www.econ.ku.dk/sorensen.
The best is the enemy of the good. (Voltaire)
1. Introduction
Professional forecasts guide market participants and inform their expectations about fu-
ture economic conditions. Given the importance of this role and the potential rewards
of accurate forecasting, one might expect that professional forecasters maximize their ac-
curacy by truthfully releasing all their information.1 As reported by Keane and Runkle
(1998), “since financial analysts’ livelihoods depend on the accuracy of their forecasts [...]
we can safely argue that these numbers accurately measure the analysts’ expectations.”
However, a number of commentators have suggested the contrary, arguing that forecast-
ers might strategically misreport their information, even when they are not interested in
manipulating the investment decisions of their target audience.
As argued for example by Croushore (1997), “some [survey] participants might shade
their forecasts more toward the consensus (to avoid unfavorable publicity when wrong),
while others might make unusually bold forecasts, hoping to stand out from the crowd.”
Following the recent evidence of the relevance of microeconomic incentives in forecasting
(e.g., Graham (1999), Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000), Lamont (2002), Welch (2000),
Zitzewitz (2001a)), this paper develops the positive theory of strategic behavior of profes-
sional forecasters. As professional forecasts are often used as proxies for the unobservable
expectations of market participants, our results have also implications for empirical tests
of investment behavior.
To understand the basic ingredients of our model, consider Figure 1 depicting yearly
GNP growth forecasts and realizations2 during the period 1972-1993 from the Business
Week Investment Outlook, as collected by Lamont.3 The plot immediately reveals that
there is substantial dispersion in the individual forecasts. Hence, our model assumes that
forecasters are privately informed. Forecasts are more dispersed in some years, e.g., 1974
(in the aftermath of the oil shock), 1982-3, and 1991. To account for the variation in the
forecast dispersion across years, the quality of private information and the precision of the
prior are parameters in our model.
1Those that are successful in predicting the future are rewarded by markets and governments alike. For
example, both Alan Greenspan and Laurence Meyer practiced economic forecasting before being appointed
to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
2A perennial problem in evaluating forecasts is that data on the realized values are revised over time.
See Section 6.4 for more on this.
3This data is taken from a survey of professional forecasters run at the end of each year by Business
Week. The economists belonging to the panel are asked to predict output, inflation, and unemployment
for the subsequent year.
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Figure 1. The circles represent individual forecasts of annual real GNP growth rate
from the Business Week Investment Outlook survey for the period 1972-1993 and the
connected triangles the realized values. Data source: Lamont (2002).
We formulate two distinct theories of strategic forecasting and contrast them with the
benchmark case of non-strategic forecasting. In order to facilitate the comparison, we
adopt a unified and tractable statistical model. The state has a normal prior distribution
and the signals of the forecasters are normally distributed around the state. After the
forecasters simultaneously release their forecasts, the state is publicly observed. In order to
isolate the eﬀect of the professional objectives of forecasters predicting the future evolution
of economic or financial variables, we assume that these forecasters cannot aﬀect the
distribution of the state variable and do not care about the investment decisions taken on
the basis of their forecasts. We therefore abstract from the additional strategic incentives
relevant to partisan forecasters, whose payoﬀ instead depends on the investment decisions
made on the basis of their forecasts.4
Consider the benchmark case of a forecaster rewarded according to the absolute accu-
racy of the prediction. A non-strategic forecaster reports honestly the posterior expectation
4For empirical evidence of partisan bias of equity analysts see e.g. Michaely and Womack (1999) and
Hong and Kubik (2003) and references therein and for theoretical investigations see e.g. Morgan and
Stocken (2003). The study of the interaction of professional and partisan objectives is left to future
research.
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of the state, a weighted average of the signal and the prior mean. When the state turns out
to be above the prior mean, the honest forecast tends to be lower than the realized state.
This empirically documented negative correlation of the forecast errors with the realized
state is often taken as evidence of herd behavior by the popular press. The academic em-
pirical literature avoids this misconception and focuses instead on the correlation between
forecasts and their errors.5 This correlation is zero for “rational” forecasts in Muth’s (1961)
sense, because they are equal to conditional expectations.6 The two theories of strategic
forecasting developed here have diﬀerent implications for this correlation.
Our first theory of strategic behavior posits that forecasters compete in a forecasting
contest with pre-specified rules.7 Forecasters are often ranked by their relative accuracy, see
e.g. the semi-annual Wall Street Journal Forecasting Survey (macroeconomic variables),
WSJ All Star Analysts (earnings) andWSJ Best on the Street (stock picking) competition.8
We find that reporting the best predictor on the state (the posterior expectation conditional
on the signal observed) is not an equilibrium in the contest. With an infinite number of
forecasters, the equilibrium strikes a balance between two contrasting forces. First, an
individual forecaster has an incentive to report the honest forecast, which is most likely to
be on the mark. Second, one gains from moving away from the prior because the number
of forecasters correctly guessing the state is lower the farther the state is from the prior
mean. In equilibrium, forecasters diﬀerentiate their prediction from those of competitors
by putting greater weight on their private signal than they would in an honest report of
the posterior expectation. Yet, rational market participants can in principle invert the
equilibrium strategy to recover the forecasters’ information thereby constructing accurate
expectations on the state.
According to the reputational cheap talk theory, forecasters wish to foster their rep-
utation for being well informed.9 In this second theory, forecasts and realized state are
used by the market to evaluate forecasting talent.10 Somewhat counter-intuitively, honest
5A number of studies have used professional forecasts to test the rational expectation hypothesis (e.g.,
Keane and Runkle (1990) and (1998)).
6Otherwise, a revised forecast would be more accurate.
7See Section 4 for a discussion of the connection with Laster, Bennett and Geoum (1999) and other
related Hotelling location models.
8See Stekler (1987) for an early study of the relative accuracy of forecasts. A number of rankings
are available on line. For example, Validea (www.validea.com), BigTipper.com (www.bigtipper.com)
and BulldogResearch.com (www.bulldogresearch.com) track stock recommendations made by Wall Street
professionals and then rank the analysts based on the performance of their selections. Forecasting contests
are run also for non-economic variables (see e.g., the National Collegiate Weather Forecasting Contest).
9See Section 5 for a discussion of the connection with Holmström (1999), Scharfstein and Stein (1990),
and other reputational models.
10Forecasters are assumed not to have private information about the talent prior to receiving the signal.
The importance of this assumption is discussed at the end of Section 5.2.
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forecasting cannot occur in equilibrium. Since the conditional expectation lies between
the signal and the prior mean, the state is expected to be closer to the prior than the
private signal is. But because the signals of more talented forecasters are on average closer
to the state, there is an incentive to pretend to have received a signal equal to the pos-
terior expectation of the state. When the market naively expects honest forecasting, the
best deviation is to release a forecast even closer to the prior mean. This accords with
the intuitive implication of career concerns suggested by recent empirical work. However,
in equilibrium, the market must have rational expectations regarding the forecasters’ be-
havior. The incentive to herd on the prior is self defeating. Equilibrium forecasts are
not shaded, but are systematically less precise than if forecasters were not strategic. The
analysts’ desire to be perceived as good forecasters turns them into poor forecasters.11
We derive implications on how the forecast dispersion varies with the quality of private
information and precision of the prior in the diﬀerent models. In the symmetric equilib-
rium of our forecasting contest the forecast error is positively correlated with the forecast,
while the correlation is negative in the reputational deviation. The reputational equilib-
rium forecast may be uncorrelated with its error, but is not eﬃcient. The theory is also
extended to allow for ex post innovation on the state. According to the empirical results
of Zitzewitz (2001a), forecast errors exhibit a strong positive correlation with the forecast
errors, consistently with our contest theory.
We believe that forecasting is a particularly apt laboratory for improving our under-
standing of strategic communication and positioning by non-partisan informed agents.
Our theorizing is inspired and disciplined by the availability of data and the richness of
institutional details, and can lead to further empirical testing. The insights gained in the
analysis can be helpful in shedding light on other social and economic problems in which
agents want to appear to be well informed, such as the choice of research topic by scientists.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the statistical model. Section 3
develops the benchmark case of honest forecasting. Section 4 introduces the forecasting
contest theory, Section 5 the reputational cheap talk theory. Section 6 compares the
predictions of the diﬀerent theories and develops some extensions. Section 7 concludes by
summarizing the results and discussing avenues for future research.
11Ironically, The Economist (“Dustmen as Economic Gurus,” 3 June 1995) reports the surprisingly good
performance of a sample of London garbagemen in forecasting key economic variables.
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2. Information
Our model features n forecasters who simultaneously issue forecasts on an uncertain state
of the world. It is common prior belief that the state x is normally distributed with mean
µ and precision ν, x ∼ N (µ, 1/ν), with p.d.f. q (x) =
p
ν/2π exp
¡
−ν (x− µ)2 /2
¢
. Each
forecaster i observes the private signal si = x + εi. Conditionally on state x, signals si
are assumed to be independently normally distributed with mean x and precisions τ i,
si|x ∼ N (x, 1/τ i), with the p.d.f. gi(si|x) =
p
τ i/2π exp
¡
−τ i (si − x)2 /2
¢
. Forecaster
i’s observation of signal si leads to a normal posterior belief on the state with mean
E [x|si] = (τ isi + νµ) / (τ i + ν) and precision τ i + ν (cf. DeGroot (1970)). The p.d.f. of
this posterior distribution is denoted by qi(x|si). After the forecasts are released, the state
of the world x is realized and observed perfectly.12
It is natural to allow forecasters to have private information about the state, because
actual forecasts are typically dispersed. Forecasters who share a common prior belief and
are given the same (public) information without private information should make identical
forecasts if they honestly report their expectations.13 Forecast dispersion could also be
due to heterogenous prior beliefs or diﬀerent models. According to industry participants,
forecasters seem to have access to the same pool of public data, but interpret it diﬀerently
depending on their model.14 In any case, forecasters have posterior beliefs that we assume
to be private. These can be reinterpreted as deriving from private information of the model
used to process the same public information. The observed forecast dispersion might also
be the outcome of strategic behavior. In order not to introduce a bias against honest
forecasting, we posit that forecasters are endowed with some private information about
the state.15
For simplicity, we have assumed that forecasts have no impact on the distribution of
the state or on the amount of information observed about its realization. Our model can
be thus applied to situations in which the state cannot be aﬀected by the forecasts and
yet can be meaningfully forecasted and later observed.16
12Section 6.4 extends the model to allow for noisy observation of the state or, equivalently, ex-post
innovation on the state.
13In their classic study on the rationality of forecasts using data from the NBER-ASA survey of pro-
fessional forecasters (later to be called the Survey of Professional Forecasters), Keane and Runkle (1990)
found that diﬀerences in individual forecasts cannot be explained by publicly available information. They
inferred that diﬀerences in forecasts are due to asymmetric information, but this conclusion rests on the
maintained assumption of honest forecasting.
14Indeed, Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Kandel and Zilberfarb (1999) have found empirical support
for heterogeneous processing of public information.
15After all, the presence of heterogeneous private information is the very reason for the market to reward
forecasters according to their (absolute or relative) accuracy.
16Additional strategic incentives would be present if forecasters were concerned with the eﬀect of their
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To simplify the presentation, our theories are developed under the assumption that
the state is uni-dimensional, so that forecasters are evaluated on the basis of a single
forecast of one variable. In some applications, forecasters are evaluated on the basis of
several contemporaneous forecasts or a whole record of past forecasts. To better capture
contests and evaluations that examine a number of diﬀerent variables, our normal learning
model can be extended to such a multi-variate setting. As explained in Sections 4 and 5,
the strategic distortions identified here hold more generally with multi-dimensional states,
signals and forecasts.
3. Honest Forecasting
Forecasters are presumed honest, unless proven strategic. As forcefully argued by Keane
and Runkle (1990), “... professional forecasters ... have an economic incentive to be
accurate. Because these professionals report to the survey the same forecasts that they
sell on to the market, their survey responses provide a reasonably accurate measure of
their expectations.”
Our benchmark forecast is the honest report of the Bayesian posterior expectation,
hi(si) = E [x|si] = τ i
τ i + ν
si +
ν
τ i + ν
µ, (3.1)
as assumed by most empirical investigations. In the normal model the posterior expecta-
tion minimizes the mean of any symmetric function of the forecast error, such as the mean
squared error (cf. Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985)).17 The honest forecast incorporates
all available evidence si, and can already oﬀer some explanations for the data. Forecasts
are dispersed due to private information. Forecasts are more dispersed and less accurate
in years with relatively little public information.18
forecasts on the state, as is natural in a number of macroeconomic contexts. However, in the presence of
many forecasters each of them individually would have a negligible influence on the state variable. The
more general case in which forecasts aﬀect the distribution of the state variable is left for future research.
17Motivated mainly by the needs of accurate probabilistic weather forecasts, a large literature in mete-
orology and statistics studies how to induce forecasters to form and state correct subjective probabilities
(cf. Dawid’s (1986) overview). Statisticians have developed scoring rules that elicit truthful information
and avoid misrepresentation of a forecaster’s beliefs (see e.g. de Finetti (1965) and Savage (1971)). In this
paper we instead adopt a positive approach and characterize strategic manipulation of forecasts.
18This is consistent with a finding reported by Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) on the ASA-NBER
survey of professional forecasters. In addition to point forecasts, that survey initially asked forecasters to
report probability distributions. Zarnowitz and Lambros documented that forecast dispersion is positively
correlated with a measure of forecast uncertainty. Likewise, in the data of our Figure 1, a regression of
the standard deviation of the forecasts on the absolute error of the consensus forecast, we find a coeﬃcient
of .145 with standard error .063. Thus, there is a significant negative correlation between accuracy and
dispersion.
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An important feature of the honest Bayesian forecast hi driving our theoretical analyses
below, is that hi is a biased forecast in the statistical sense. With probability one we have
x 6= µ, and therefore E [hi|x] 6= x. In fact, E [hi|x] always lies between x and µ.19 Even
with honest reporting, the forecast error hi − x is negatively correlated with x (since
E[(hi − x)x] = E[(τ iεi + ν (µ− x))x/ (τ i + ν)] = −1/ (τ i + ν) < 0).
Nevertheless, the honest forecast hi(si) has the key statistical property of being uncorre-
lated with its forecast error hi(si)−x: E[E[x|si] (E[x|si]− x)] = E[E[E[x|si] (E[x|si]− x) |si]] =
E[E[x|si]E[E[x|si]−x|si]] = 0. This orthogonality property states that the honest forecast
does not carry information about its forecast error. A large body of empirical literature on
rational expectations (e.g., Keane and Runkle (1990) and (1998)) tests for orthogonality
to see if forecasters are rational. Orthogonality may seem a necessary property of rational
forecasts, but this is not the case. Asymmetric scoring rules generally result in forecasts
violating the property, as noted by Granger (1969) and Zellner (1986).20 In our model we
instead maintain symmetry and examine whether rational players make non-orthogonal
forecasts for strategic reasons.
As can also be verified with the data used in Figure 1, forecasts tend to be less volatile
than realizations. This could suggest to some naive observers that forecasters herd. In
particular, forecasters often fall short of the mark in years with extreme growth rates. But
the realization x = hi+(x− hi) is more volatile than any orthogonal forecast hi when the
forecasters’ information is noisy, V [x] = V [hi] + V [x− hi] > V [hi]. This is almost always
the case for macroeconomic, earnings, and weather forecasts.
Consider briefly classical statistics, i.e. forecasting in the absence of prior information.
Forecaster i’s maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), maximizing gi (si|xi) over xi, would
be si. Since E[si|x] = x, the MLE forecast is unbiased and the forecast error εi is indepen-
dent of x. However, the maximum likelihood forecast violates the orthogonality property,
since E[si(si − x)] = E[(x+ εi) εi] = 1/τ i > 0. Note that the MLE can be equivalently
seen as resulting from Bayesian updating when the prior distribution on the state is the
improper uniform distribution on the real line. We have chosen to posit a normal prior on
x to reflect that forecasters typically share some information about the variable to be pre-
dicted. The presence of prior information drives the results of the two theories developed
19In its widely circulated World Economic Outlook, even the International Monetary Fund (2001)
laments that forecasters typically fall short of predicting changes in macroeconomic performance (cf.
pages 6—8). In particular, forecasts are often too optimistic when the economy enters a recession, and
pessimistic when the economy expands. It is misleading to interpret this as an indication that economic
forecasters use their information ineﬃciently.
20Granger (1999) defines generalized forecast errors for any given loss function, and notes that these
errors satisfy orthogonality.
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below.21
4. Forecasting Contest Theory
Forecasters often participate in contests that reward the best performers.22 It is natural
to investigate whether the competitive pressure from other forecasters provides the right
incentives to forecast honestly. This section develops a positive theory of a symmetric
simultaneous winner-take-all contest with a large number of forecasters. In our forecasting
contest, the participating forecasters simultaneously submit individual forecasts based on
their private information. A prize is awarded to the forecaster whose forecast is closest to
the realized state.
There is remarkably little previous work on forecasters’ behavior in contests. Steele and
Zidek (1980) were the first to study a sequential forecasting contest among two privately
informed forecasters. They assumed away game-theoretic considerations by supposing
truthful reporting by the first forecaster. After observing the first forecast, the second
guesser faces a simple decision problem and has a clear advantage.23 Indeed, Kutsoati and
Bernhardt (2000) have empirically confirmed that the financial analysts who release late
earning forecasts tend to overshoot the consensus forecast in the direction of their private
information. Laster, Bennett and Geoum (1999) studied a winner-take-all simultaneous
forecasting contest in which all forecasters share the same (public) information. We in-
stead allow forecasters to have private information on the state and cast winner-take-all
forecasting contests as problems of strategic location.24 A forecaster’s payoﬀ is equal to
the probability that the realized state is closer to her forecast than to any other forecast.
This probability of falling closest to the state is equivalent to the market share or fraction
of votes to be maximized in Hotelling’s (1929) pure location game.25
21The importance of the role of public information is validated by a number of empirical studies. For
example, Welch (2000) finds evidence that security analysts are strongly influenced by the prevailing
consensus.
22In the much publicized Wall Street Journal semi-annual forecasting contest the most accurate fore-
caster over the previous six months is typically rewarded with a writeup. Even in the absence of monetary
prizes, the publicity eﬀect to the winner can be large.
23Steele and Zidek and some follow-up papers focused on the characterization of the second guesser’s
probability of winning.
24There would be no reason to reward accurate forecasters in the absence of heterogeneous private
information. It turns out that the symmetric equilibrium in the forecasting contest is more appealing once
private information is introduced, being in pure rather than mixed strategies.
25An extensive literature in economics and political science studies versions of this game without private
information. As it is well known (cf. Osborne and Pitchik (1986)), equilibria in this classic game crucially
depend on the number of players and often involve mixed strategies. Our forecasting contest theory
extends Hotelling’s simultaneous location game to scenarios where the forecasters (firms or politicians)
have private information on the distribution of the state (location of consumers or voters).
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4.1. Model
The forecasting contest game proceeds as follows. First, each forecaster observes the
private signal si. Assume that the signals of all the forecasters are of common precision
τ .26 Second, the forecasters simultaneously submit their forecasts ci. Third, the true state
x is publicly observed and the forecaster whose forecast ci turns out to be closest to x wins
a prize proportional to the total number of forecasters participating in the contest. In the
case of a tie, all winners share the prize evenly.
To play this game, forecasters form conjectures about the distribution of the opponents’
forecasts and calculate their best response. Payoﬀs to forecaster i can then be defined
as follows. Suppose forecaster i receives signal si and conjectures that the opponents’
forecasts are distributed according to the conditional density γ(c|x, si) on the real line. By
conditional independence of the signals, x is suﬃcient for si so that we can write γ(c|x).
Suppose forecaster i submits the forecast ci. The forecasts of the many opponents are
dense on the support of γ, so forecaster i wins if and only if x = ci. This happens with
chance qi(ci|si). Conditional on winning, the size of the prize obtained by each player is
1/γ(ci|ci). In conclusion, the expected payoﬀ to forecaster i when releasing forecast ci is:
Ui(ci|si) = qi(ci|si)
γ(ci|ci) . (4.1)
A companion paper (Ottaviani and Sørensen (2002)) provides a formal derivation of this
payoﬀ function as the limit of payoﬀ functions when the number of (identical) forecasters
tends to infinity.27
4.2. Deviation
We now show that honest forecasting is not an equilibrium. Consider a single forecaster
with signal s competing against forecasters who are all reporting their honest forecasts.
Without loss of generality, let s > µ as depicted in Figure 2. What is the best reply for
such a forecaster?
According to (4.1), the best forecast maximizes the ratio between the probability of
winning the first prize and the number of forecasters with whom this prize is shared. First,
the probability of winning conditional on signal s is equal to the posterior belief on the
state x|s, the normal distribution centered at E[x|s] and depicted on the right in Figure
26This symmetry assumption can be compatible with the fact that forecasters have unobserved hetero-
geneous forecasting abilities – see Section 5.
27Numerical simulations confirm that the equilibrium of the limit game is a good approximation of the
equilibria in games with a large number of forecasters.
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2. Second, the curve on the left in Figure 2 depicts γ(x|x), the denominator of the ratio
maximized by the forecaster. This represents how the mass of forecasters with correct
forecasts changes as a function of the state x. The shape of γ(x|x) depends on the weight
assigned by the other forecasters to their signal. Since the other forecasters put a positive
weight on the prior mean, γ(x|x) is bell shaped around µ.28 As clear from the graphical
illustration, the probability of winning is flat at the honest E[x|s], while the frequency of
correct forecasts is decreasing in the distance of the state x from the prior mean µ. At the
posterior expectation it is then optimal to move away from prior mean toward the private
signal, as the second-order loss resulting from lower probability of winning is more than
compensated by the first-order gain due to reduced competition:29
-
6
Others
γ(x|x)
Posterior
q(x|s)
µ E[x|s] s
x
Figure 2. Optimal deviation in the forecasting contest model.
Proposition 1 (Exaggeration in Contest Deviation) If all other forecasters are fore-
casting honestly by applying the strategy c(s) = (τs+ νµ) / (τ + ν), the contest drives
forecaster i to exaggerate.
The optimal deviation forecast is a weighted average of si and µ, but the weight on
µ is lower than in the honest forecast. The contest deviation forecast is then positively
correlated with its error: when x is above µ the forecast is too high on average. More
generally, it is optimal to bias the forecast against the prior mean whenever the other
forecasters use a common strategy consisting of a convex combination of the prior and the
signal received.
28It is worth noticing that γ(x|x) is not a probability density function. For example, when the other
forecasters put zero weight on the prior (for instance because they have perfectly informative signals),
γ(x|x) is constantly equal to 1.
29If x and s were multivariate Normal, a picture similar to Figure 2 would arise in the appropriate multi-
dimensional space, with γ (x|x) multivariate bell-shaped around µ and the posterior q (x|s) multivariate
bell-shaped around E[x|s].Proposition 1 then continues to hold.
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4.3. Equilibrium
Having established that honest forecasting is not compatible with equilibrium, we are now
ready to characterize a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium.30 At such an equilibrium,
each forecaster applies for every signal si the best response to her conjecture about the
opponents’ distribution γ (c|x), and this conjecture is correctly derived from the strategies
actually used.
Proposition 2 (Exaggeration in Contest Equilibrium) For any values of ν and τ >
0 the contest has a unique symmetric linear equilibrium c(s) = Cs + (1− C)µ with
C ∈ [0, 1]. Forecasters put more weight on their private information than according to the
conditional expectation: C =
¡√
τ 2 + 4ντ − τ
¢
/2ν > τ/ (ν + τ).
In the absence of private information (τ = 0), the only symmetric equilibrium is in
mixed strategies as in Laster, Bennett and Geoum (1999) and Osborne and Pitchik (1986),
who find that with infinitely many symmetrically informed players the distribution of equi-
librium locations replicates the common prior distribution about x. The addition of private
information has the desirable eﬀect of inducing a symmetric location equilibrium in pure
rather than mixed strategies. Forecasters diﬀerentiate themselves from their competitors
by putting excessive weight on their signals. As in the honest forecast, the weight on the
signal is increasing in τ and decreasing in ν. For all values of ν and τ , this weight is larger
than in the honest forecast, so the contest gives an incentive to move away from µ.31 The
symmetric equilibrium strikes a balance: opponents disperse themselves to such an extent
that forecaster i is happy to reply precisely with the same dispersion. The equilibrium
forecast is positively correlated with its error.
The contest equilibrium satisfies C < 1, so the forecast is not as extreme as the
maximum likelihood estimate (MLE). However, the MLE results in the contest when the
prior on the state x is improper, i.e. uniform on the real line. If the opponents forecast
c = s, their forecasts are normally distributed around x, and the term γ (c|c) is constant
in c. Forecaster i’s best reply will then be ci = si, since this constant term does not
distort the forecaster’s problem. Truthtelling by all forecasters is then an equilibrium in
the absence of public information. The contest distortion thus depends on the presence of
prior information that anchors the forecasts of the opponents around µ. The tendency of
opponents to cluster around the prior mean drives forecasters away from it.
30We take a positive approach and do not search for asymmetric or non-linear equilibria.
31The equilibrium in linear strategies exists for all parameter values. This is slightly surprising since a
best reply to honesty did not exist for all parameter values. Intuitively, with increased weight on their
signal, the opponents are less concentrated around µ, mitigating the incentive to move away from µ.
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5. Reputational Cheap Talk Theory
While in a forecasting contest, competition takes place according to rules clearly set out in
advance, markets often reward successful performance in subtler and less structured ways.
For example, the labor and financial markets perform informal (or subjective) evaluations
of the forecasters’ track record and performance. This section develops a positive theory of
forecasting in which forecasters aim to impress the market with their talent. It is convenient
to think of the market as performing the passive role of an evaluator. The market evaluates
a forecaster’s quality of information (or talent) by comparing the forecast with the ex-post
realization of the state.32 Instead of committing ex ante to a particular reward scheme,
the market optimally evaluates ex post the forecasting talent based on all the information
available. Forecasters with a better reputation can provide more valuable information and
can therefore command higher compensation. To foster their careers, forecasters want to
develop a good reputation for accuracy.
The first reputational cheap talk game was formulated in Scharfstein and Stein’s (1990)
seminal paper on reputational herding.33 While Scharfstein and Stein assumed that better
informed forecasters have conditionally more correlated signals, we focus on the case with
conditionally independent signals and extend our model in Section 6.4 to allow for condi-
tional signal correlation.34 Reputational forecasting is a game of cheap talk (Crawford and
Sobel (1982)), since a forecaster’s payoﬀ depends on the forecast released only indirectly
through the market’s evaluation. The forecaster plays the role of sender and the market
is the receiver.
5.1. Model
The structure of our basic statistical model needs to be extended to introduce a latent
parameter representing the unknown talent ti > 0 of forecaster i. We assume that fore-
casters and the market share a common non-degenerate prior belief pi(ti) on forecaster
i’s talent, with all the talents ti and the state x statistically independent. It remains
the common prior that x ∼ N (µ, 1/ν). Conditionally on state x and talent ti, signal si
32In Zwiebel’s (1995) model ability adds instead to the productivity of the agent, rather than parame-
terizing the quality of information about the state.
33Earlier, Holmström (1999) in the second part of his paper analyzed the behavior of an agent who
aims at convincing the market that she is well informed in a situation in which the decision made aﬀects
whether the state is observed by the market or not. We instead follow Scharfstein and Stein by assuming
that the forecasts influence neither the realization nor the observability of the state of the world.
34See Ottaviani and Sørensen (2000) on the connection of the reputational herding model of Scharfstein
and Stein (1990) and Trueman (1994) with the statistical herding model of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and
Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992).
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is distributed with p.d.f. g˜ (si|x, ti). We assume that there exists a p.d.f. gˆ on [0,∞),
such that g˜ (si|x, ti) = tigˆ (ti|si − x|) /2 – then we have a symmetric location experi-
ment where ti is the scale parameter. Since we are extending our model, we keep the
assumption that si|x ∼ N (x, 1/τ). The primitives gˆ and p are thus restricted to satisfy
gi(si|x) =
R∞
0
g˜ (si|x, ti) pi (ti) dti. We naturally assume that a greater forecasting talent
is associated with smaller signal errors, i.e. that the likelihood ratio g˜ (si|x, ti) /g˜ (si|x, t0i)
is increasing in |si − x| when ti < t0i. As pointed out in Example 3.3 of Lehmann (1955),
this is equivalent to the log-concavity in a of gˆ (ea).35 Straightforward algebra shows that
both conditions reduce to monotonicity of the elasticity (εgˆ0 (ε) /gˆ (ε) is decreasing in ε).36
We further simplify the problem by eliminating any form of payoﬀ interaction among
the forecasters. First, conditionally on x and t1, . . . , tn, the n forecasters’ private signals
si are conditionally independent, so that forecaster i cannot signal anything to the market
about tj for j 6= i. Second, forecaster i’s objective depends solely on the posterior beliefs
about ti, regardless of the posterior beliefs about tj.37 With these assumptions there is no
strategic interaction among forecasters and so the problem of each forecaster is separable
from that of the others. For the remainder of this section, we will then focus on a single
forecaster and remove the subscript i.
The reputational cheap talk game proceeds as follows. First, the forecaster observes
the private signal s. Second, the forecaster issues the forecast (or message) m. Third,
the true state x is observed by the market which uses (m,x) to update the belief p (t)
about the forecaster’s talent t.38 The forecast m thus serves the role of a signal sent to the
market about s, and the observation of additional information x allows for sorting. The
forecaster’s goal is to obtain a favorable updating on the precision, with the understanding
that the market rewards a good reputation.
To update the beliefs about the forecaster’s talent, the evaluator applies a conjecture
on the forecaster’s strategy mapping s into m and derives the distribution of m condi-
35As hinted by Lehmann (1955), if gˆ is decreasing then the assumption is weaker than log-concavity
of gˆ. Under this stronger property, Lehmann’s (1988) Theorem 5.3 would guarantee that the talent ti
parameterizes forecaster i’s Blackwell eﬀectiveness in the class of monotone decision procedures.
36For an example of distributions satisfying our assumptions, let gˆ (ε) = 2K1 exp
¡
−ε4/12
¢
implying
that s|x, t has an exponential power distribution (Box and Tiao (1973), page 517) with p.d.f. g˜ (s|x, t) =
K1t exp
³
−t4 (s− x)4 /12
´
, and let t−4 follow a Gamma distribution such that t > 0 has p.d.f. p (t) =
K2τ
3/2t−4 exp
¡
−3τ2t−4/4
¢
. Appealing to the well-known p.d.f. of the inverse Gaussian distribution, it is
straightforward to find the normalizing constantsK1 andK2 and verify that g(s|x) = E[g˜ (s|x, t)]. Clearly,
log (gˆ (ε)) = log (2K1)− ε4/12 is concave and decreasing in ε, implying also log-concavity of gˆ (ea).
37See Ottaviani and Sørensen (2003) for an extension of the model to allow for relative reputational
concerns.
38In Prendergast and Stole’s (1996) reputational signaling model instead the state is not observed. See
Section 5.2 below for a more detailed discussion of the other diﬀerences with Prendergast and Stole.
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tional on x and t, denoted by ϕ (m|x, t). Bayes’ rule is then used by the evaluator to
calculate the posterior reputation p (t|m,x) = ϕ (m|t, x) p(t)/ϕ(m|x) where ϕ (m|x) =R∞
0
ϕ (m|t, x) p(t) dt. To model the forecaster’s preferences over posterior reputations, we
take a two-step von Neumann-Morgenstern formulation. We assume that the forecaster
correctly knows the ϕ function used by the evaluator, so that the forecaster can predict
how the posterior reputation is calculated. The utility of reputation p (t|m,x) is then given
by its expected value of the Bernoulli function u (t),39
W (m|x) ≡
Z ∞
0
u(t)p (t|m,x) dt. (5.1)
Since a signal with higher t is more valuable in all monotone decision problems, we
assume that u is strictly increasing. This implies that the market rewards more forecasters
with a (first-order stochastically) better reputation. When reporting the message m, the
forecaster does not yet know the state x, but believes it to be distributed according to
q (x|s). The forecaster then chooses the message m which maximizes the expected W ,
U(m|s) ≡
Z ∞
−∞
W (m|x)q (x|s) dx. (5.2)
Diﬀerent messages might be diﬀerently appealing to a forecaster depending on the signal
received.
5.2. Deviation
In order to show that truthtelling cannot be an equilibrium, consider what happens when
the evaluator conjectures that the forecaster applies the benchmark honest strategy h (s).
A forecaster with signal s > µ believes that the state is concentrated around E [x|s], a
weighted average of the prior mean µ and the signal s represented in Figure 3. If the
forecaster were to honestly report h (s) = E [x|s], by inverting the strategy h (.) the mar-
ket would infer that the signal s is higher than E [x|s]. Note that the forecaster believes
that the state is distributed symmetrically and unimodally around the posterior expec-
tation. As proved formally below, signals closer to the state are better news about the
talent of a forecaster and so result in higher expected reputational payoﬀ. The fore-
caster then wants to be perceived as having a signal sˆ equal to the posterior expectation
h (s) = E [x|s] on the state. We conclude that if the market naively believes that the
39This can be seen as a psychological game, in which the sender’s payoﬀ depends on the receiver’s belief.
The payoﬀ is equal to the expected value of a function over types evaluated using the posterior belief about
an individual’s type based on the information signaled in equilibrium. A formally similar expected utility
formulation has also been adopted in diﬀerent contexts by Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) and
Bernheim (1995).
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forecast reflects truthfully the forecaster’s posterior expectation, the forecaster deviates
by reporting d (s) = h(h (s)) = E[x|sˆ = E[x|s]].40
-
6
Prior
N(µ, 1ν )
Posterior
N(E[x|s], 1ν+τ )
µ E[x|s] s
x
Figure 3. Optimal deviation in the reputational cheap talk model.
Another interpretation of the conservative deviation is based on the following logic.
A forecaster who receives a signal s above the prior mean µ, concludes that the average
forecast error E [ε|s] = ν (s− µ) / (τ + ν) is positive. The forecaster then optimally devi-
ates by removing this expected error from the true signal and so pretending to have signal
sˆ = s−E [ε|s] = E [x|s]. In this deviation, forecasters are biased towards the prior mean:41
Proposition 3 (Conservatism in Reputational Deviation) If the evaluator conjec-
tures honest forecasting h (s), the forecaster shades the forecast towards the prior mean
by reporting
d (s) = h (h (s)) =
µ
τ
τ + ν
¶2
s+
Ã
1−
µ
τ
τ + ν
¶2!
µ.
Note that if the signal is perfectly informative or the prior is improper, the posterior
expectation puts zero weight on the prior belief and so the inferred signal would be equal
to E [x|s]. In both these cases truthtelling is an equilibrium. Likewise, this theory relies
40In the more general case with x and si multivariate and univariate talent t, we can extend the model
by letting g˜ (si|x, ti) = tigˆ (ti||x− si||) /2. The property that signals closer to the state are better news
about the talent is retained. A picture similar to Figure 3 arises in the multi-dimensional space and
Proposition 3 continues to hold.
41This result holds regardless of the forecaster’s attitude toward risk. As seen in the proof of the
proposition, posterior reputations depend only on the inferred absolute forecast error |εˆ| and are ordered
in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. Equation (5.2) implies that forecasters are risk-neutral
with respect to lotteries over posterior reputations. Any forecaster with an increasing u therefore ranks
messages the same way, regardless of the second derivative of u.
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on the fact that the market sequentially rationally uses all the information available ex
post to evaluate the forecaster. To understand this, suppose that instead the market
were to commit ex ante to evaluate the forecaster by comparing the forecast m with the
realization x, according to the magnitude of the absolute distance |m− x|. In this case,
the forecaster’s optimal strategy is to honestly report m = E[x|s]. This is essentially the
default case of honest forecasting also explained in Section 2. Notice that this could be
reconciled with the reputational theory by positing that the market (incorrectly) believes
that the forecaster’s message is equal to her signal, m = s. It is perhaps quite natural that
when forecasters use a separating strategy, the market treats them as if m = s. But this
market conjecture remains incorrect in the presence of prior information, as the forecaster’s
best reply is m = E[x|s].
According to the proposition, sophisticated forecasters who are taken at face value
report conservative forecasts in order to fool the market into believing that they have more
accurate signals. The full characterization of the deviation incentive is relevant for several
purposes. Understanding the pressure to deviate from honesty provides intuition for the
impossibility of truthtelling and sheds light on out-of-equilibrium forces. If the forecaster
has mixed incentives, caring about both the reputation and the forecast accuracy, the
incentive to deviate from honesty persists, and we can expect to find conservativeness in
equilibrium. Finally, conservatism arises in real-world outcomes of communication when
the evaluator is not fully rational.42
The conservatism of Proposition 3 is a new insight into herding (as a disequilibrium
phenomenon). As the prior mean aggregates public information released previously by
others, forecasters tend to herd. Herd behavior is here driven by concerns for absolute
rather than relative accuracy. The content and logic of this result are diﬀerent from the
finding of Scharfstein and Stein (1990). Scharfstein and Stein argued that reputational
herding requires the signals of better informed managers to be more correlated, condition-
ally on the state of the world. Our result instead does not rely on conditionally correlated
signals.
At a superficial level, our result is reminiscent of Prendergast’s (1993) “yes-men” eﬀect,
but is driven by diﬀerent forces and essentially goes in the opposite direction.43 While in
42For an example of reputational signaling with bounded rationality, see Zitzewitz’s (2001b) model where
the market uses a simple econometric technique to evaluate the quality of the information contained in
the forecasts. In his model forecasters have information on their own ability. As discussed below, this
introduces an incentive to exaggerate.
43Prendergast examines how to induce an agent to gather and report information. The agent has access
to two private signals, one on the state of the world and the other on the principal’s private signal on the
state. If the principal commits to a reward scheme based on the diﬀerence between the agent’s report and
the principal’s signal, the agent honestly reports her best estimate of the principal’s private signal. Then
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Prendergast’s model the agent does not suﬃciently move away from her signal about the
principal’s signal, in our model the agent does not move away from the prior mean. By
identifying the principal’s signal with the ex-post (noisy) realization of the state, it is seen
that Prendergast’s deviation report is biased toward the state, rather than the prior. As
shown in the next section, also in our model the incentive to mis-report is self defeating.
In both models, in equilibrium the agent cannot transmit all her information.
The incentive to deviate towards the prior relies on the assumption that forecasters
do not know more than the evaluator about their forecasting talent (a.k.a. ability).44 A
forecaster who instead has private information about her own ability, will try to signal
it. Since the posterior expectation with better information is further away from the prior
mean, the incentive to signal ability generates an additional force pushing in the opposite
direction to the one identified in Proposition 3.45 The tendency to put excessive weight
on the private signal is isolated by Prendergast and Stole’s (1996) managerial reputational
signaling model without ex-post information about the state. When evaluating forecasters,
the market has instead access to additional information about the state, in the form of
ex-post realization or contemporaneous forecasts of others. The addition of such ex-post
information introduces the new conservatism eﬀect isolated in Proposition 3.46 Overall,
concerns for absolute accuracy drive forecasters to be conservative if they do not know
their ability, but to exaggerate if they know it well enough.47
5.3. Equilibrium
According to Proposition 3, honest forecasting is incompatible with equilibrium. Since this
is a cheap talk game, ruling out truthtelling implies that there cannot be any fully sepa-
rating equilibrium. By definition, in a fully separating equilibrium, the strategy mapping
the agent’s report contains information from her two sources, and the principal can extract only part of
the agent’s direct signal about the state.
44This assumption allowed us to simplify the analysis, but is questionable in a dynamic setting since
forecasters would learn more about their precision than the evaluator. Analysis of the resulting two-
dimensional signaling problem is sensibly more involved. Preliminary investigations show that our con-
servatism result is robust to the introduction of small amounts of private information on own ability. See
our companion paper (Ottaviani and Sørensen (2003)) for more on this.
45Unconditionally on the state, better informed agents have more variable posterior expectations. The
variance of the honest forecast unconditional on the state, V [h] = τ/ (ν (τ + ν)), increases in τ .
46Exaggeration to signal own ability is also robust to the introduction of a small amount of ex-post
information about the state. Trueman (1994) and Zitzewitz (2001b) exhibit exaggeration to signal own
forecasting ability in the presence of ex-post information.
47As also suggested by Avery and Chevalier (1999), if younger managers have little private information
about their own ability, they should have a tendency to be conservative; older managers would instead
exaggerate, being more confident about their ability. Notice the contrast with Prendergast and Stole’s
(1996) prediction of impetuous youngsters and jaded old-timers when the same manager privately informed
about own ability makes repeated observable decisions with a constant and unobserved state.
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signals into forecasts can be inverted. As before, the evaluator infers the signal through
inversion of the strategy, but the forecaster with signal s then wishes to deviate to the
forecast corresponding to signal s0 = E[x|s], which is diﬀerent from s whenever s 6= µ.48
Non-existence of a fully separating equilibrium is not a particularly surprising finding
in a cheap-talk setting. Another common property of cheap-talk games is that there exists
an equilibrium with complete pooling. In such a babbling equilibrium, the forecaster issues
the same message m regardless of the signal received, and any message received by the
evaluator is interpreted as carrying no information about the signal. More generally, not all
information is conveyed to the evaluator. Equilibrium forecasting must necessarily involve
some degree of pooling (or bunching) of signals into messages.
Due to the cheap talk nature of the game, the actual language used to send equilib-
rium messages is indeterminate. But the market can easily translate message m into the
best estimate conditionally on m, namely E[x|m]. So, the forecaster is eﬀectively com-
municating E[x|m] to the evaluator. Being a conditional expectation of x, this forecast
is uncorrelated with its error. In this sense, the reputational equilibrium forecast satisfies
the orthogonality property. We conclude:
Proposition 4 (Coarseness in Reputational Equilibrium) There is no reputational
cheap talk equilibrium with full revelation of information. Any equilibrium can be defined
with a language such that the forecast has the orthogonality property.
Because of the endogenous coarseness of the message, forecaster can communicate only
part of the information about the state x. Additional information losses can result in
dynamic extensions of the model, consistently with what observed by Welch (2000). Note
that some information about the forecaster’s talent t is also lost. This in turn implies
an additional loss of information about future states of the world, because more precise
information on t would be useful to assess the value of future forecasts from the same
individual.
We now show by example that there is always a partially separating equilibrium in
which some information is conveyed. This equilibrium involves a binary forecasting strat-
egy, whereby the forecaster reports a high message mH whenever the signal s weakly
exceeds a threshold signal and a low message mL otherwise. The binary strategy in this
48In the presence of commitment or bounded rationality, the incentive to deviate can instead persist
in equilibrium. The importance of commitment is illustrated by the predictions obtained in the model
of Prendergast and Stole (1996), where the decision is delegated to the informed agent with reputational
concerns. For an example of reputational signaling with bounded rationality, see Zitzewitz’s (2001b) model
where the market uses a simple econometric technique to evaluate the quality of the information contained
in the forecasts.
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equilibrium is symmetric, with threshold signal equal to µ. Expressed in the natural lan-
guage that identifies messages with their meaning understood in equilibrium, we have
mL = E[x|s < µ] and mH = E[x|s ≥ µ]. A forecaster is indiﬀerent between these two
messages when receiving signal µ. When observing a higher signal s > µ, the forecaster
expects high values of the state to be realized and so prefers to send message mH rather
than mL in order to indicate a positive signal, implying smaller average errors:
Proposition 5 (Binary Reputational Equilibrium) In the reputational cheap talk
model there exists a symmetric binary equilibrium, and this is the unique equilibrium
in binary strategies.
The reputational cheap talk theory can be extended to allow for private information of
forecasting ability, mixed objectives, and concern for relative reputation among forecasters.
We refer to the companion paper Ottaviani and Sørensen (2003) for a broader theoretical
analysis and discussion of the empirical literature. Rather than performing direct tests of
reputational cheap talk, most of the existing empirical literature provides indirect evidence
of reputational concerns based on heterogeneity across forecasters. Lamont (2002) finds
that older forecasters tend to deviate more from the consensus. Chevalier and Ellison
(1999) find that older mutual fund managers have bolder investment strategies. Hong,
Kubik and Solomon (2000) conclude that the lower accuracy of older stock analysts is due
the fact that they move earlier. Unfortunately, no one has so far attempted to model the
endogenous timing of forecasts when the agents are concerned about their reputation or
relative accuracy.49
6. Discussion
We now compare the empirical predictions of the diﬀerent theories.
6.1. Forecast Variability
Except for the reputational equilibrium forecasts, we have found linear forecasting rules
of the form fi (si) = Fisi + (1− Fi)µ for some constant weight Fi between 0 and 1. The
conditional distribution of the linear forecast is then
fi|x ∼ N
¡
Fix+ (1− Fi)µ, F 2i /τ i
¢
. (6.1)
49In Gul and Lundholm (1995) forecasters care about the absolute accuracy as well as delay. A forecaster
with a more extreme signal acts earlier at equilibrium.
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We now describe the variance of the forecasts under the diﬀerent theories. Observe that
the prior variance 1/ν of x scales all variables of the model, while the weights Fi depend
on τ i only through the relative signal precision ρi ≡ τ i/ν. Apart from a factor 1/ν, all
variances below can therefore be written as a function of ρi.
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Figure 4. Conditional variances of forecasts as function of relative precision ρi, fixing
ν = 1. The solid line shows the conditional variance of the honest forecast V [h|x], the
dotted line the reputational deviation forecast V [d|x], the line with full dots the
reputational equilibrium forecast V [r|x = µ], and the line with empty dots the contest
forecast V [c|x].
Honest Forecast. The conditional variance of the honest forecast V [hi|x] = (1/ν)ρi/(1+
ρ2i ) is increasing in the signal precision if the forecaster is imprecise enough (ρi < 1), but
decreasing if precise (ρi > 1). When the signal is poorly informative (ρi ≈ 0), the honest
forecast is concentrated on the prior mean and so the conditional variance is also near
0. When ρi is very large, the conditional variance is again near 0 because a perfectly
informative signal gives an honest forecast concentrated on the true state.
Contest Equilibrium Forecast. The conditional variance of the forecast in the sym-
metric equilibrium of our symmetric contest (with τ i = τ and so ρi = ρ) is C
2/τ =
(1/ν)
³
2 + ρ−
p
ρ2 + 4ρ
´
/2. In the limit as the private signals become uninformative
ρ → 0, the distribution of equilibrium locations replicates the common prior distribution
about the state and its conditional variance converges to 1/ν. This limit result is con-
sistent with the findings of Osborne and Pitchik (1986) and Laster, Bennett and Geoum
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(1999). Note that the conditional variance of the distribution of the equilibrium contest
forecasts decreases in ρ and converges to 0 as ρ → ∞. We conclude that the addition
of private information decreases the conditional variance of the contest forecasts, but this
variance is consistently higher than the one resulting from honest forecasting.50 This is in
sharp contrast to the non-monotonicity of the conditional variance of the honest forecast.
In cases with imprecise private signals, one could check empirically whether forecasts are
very widely dispersed as in the contest, or quite close together as in the case of honest
forecasting.
Reputational Deviation Forecast. The conditional variance of the reputational devi-
ation forecast is (1/ν) ρ3i / (1 + ρi)
4 with variance first increasing in ρi, maximal at ρi = 3,
and then decreasing in ρi. Compared to the forecasts under truthtelling and in the fore-
casting contest, the reputational deviation forecast puts more weight on the prior mean,
and is therefore less variable.51
Reputational EquilibriumForecast. The reputational equilibrium forecast ri of Propo-
sition 5 is binomially distributed and therefore not directly comparable with the normally
distributed forecasts that result in the other cases described above. The following char-
acterization allows a partial comparison when the forecasters use the natural language
mH = E [x|s > µ] and mL = E [x|s ≤ µ].
Proposition 6 (Distribution of the Binary Reputational Equilibrium) In the bi-
nary equilibrium of the reputational model mH − µ = µ − mL =
p
2ρi/πν (1 + ρi) and
V [ri|x] ≤ (1/ν) 2ρi/ (π (1 + ρi)).
The amount by which the message moves the prior beliefs on the state increases in
the relative precision ρi of the forecaster’s signal. To compare the conditional variance
of the reputational binary equilibrium forecast with that of the honest forecast, observe
that 2ρi/ (π (1 + ρi)) ≤ ρi/ (1 + ρi)
2 if and only if ρi ≤ (π − 2) /2. If the signal is not
50Morris and Shin (2002) consider a model in which informed agents are interested in being close to
the state as well as to the average action taken by the others. In their symmetric equilibrium, agents
underreact to private information. Revelation of public information might then result in an increase of
action variability and so reduce welfare. Forecasters want instead to be far from the others and so overreact
to private information. It can be shown that the variance of the contest equilibrium forecast conditional
on the state is decreasing in the precision of the prior. More public information in our contest model
unambiguously decreases forecast variability.
51Graham (1999) was the first to develop comparative statics predictions in a reputational cheap talk
model. He considered a sequential setting with binary signals and he looked at how the second mover’s
incentives for deviation from a separating equilibrium are aﬀected by changes in prior reputation, forecast
ability and conditional signal correlation.
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very precise, the conditional variance is uniformly higher under honesty than in the binary
equilibrium. But the inequality is reversed when the signal has high precision and x is
close to µ. In that case, the signal and thus the honest forecast are highly concentrated
near µ, while the reputational forecast is highly variable with even chance of a positive
and negative update of amount
p
2νρi/π (1 + ρi).
Comparison of Variances. Figure 4 plots the conditional variances as a function of ρi
when ν = 1 for four forecasts: honest h, contest c, reputational deviation d, reputational
binary equilibrium r. The graph makes clear that herding or exaggeration can be inferred
from forecast dispersion only after controlling for the quality of the forecaster’s information.
This point is also emphasized by Zitzewitz (2001a).
6.2. Properties of Forecast Errors
The linear forecasts (6.1) with weight Fi < 1 are not unbiased, since E[fi|x] > x when
x < µ and E[fi|x] < x when x > µ. The conditional mean of the linear forecast only
goes part of the way from the prior µ to the true state x. We see that all these forecasts,
including the honest one, possess the oft-lamented property that forecasters fail to predict
extreme values. This property is therefore not evidence of ineﬃcient conservativeness on
the part of the forecasters.
In a similar vein, the forecast error fi−x is negatively correlated with x (since E[(fi−
x)x] = E[(Fiεi + (1− Fi) (µ− x))x] = − (1− Fi) /ν < 0). When x is high (low) the error
tends to be negative (positive). The forecast error can be predicted after the state x has
been observed, even if forecasters are not conservative. Furthermore, even though their
signals are conditionally independent, there is correlation among the forecast errors of any
pair i, j of forecasters. The covariance of fi − x = (Fiεi + (1− Fi) (µ− x)) with fj − x
is (1− Fi) (1− Fj) /ν > 0. This covariance is positive because forecasters tend to make
equal-signed errors of opposite sign of x.
To remove this correlation, one could alternatively study forecaster i’s shock as fi −
E[fi|x] = Fiεi. This error follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance F 2i /τ i,
and is uncorrelated with x and with the errors of other forecasters. This makes them
useful observations for regression analysis. Empirically, E[fi|x] may not be known by the
data analyst even when x has been realized. It is a common approach to estimate E[fi|x]
using the consensus forecast, to which we now turn.
When n ≥ 2 forecasters have issued their forecasts, it is simple to calculate the un-
weighted average forecast f¯ =
Pn
i=1 fi/n, often referred to as the consensus forecast. In
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general, this is not the optimal forecast given the n signals.52 For example, when the
individual errors εi are statistically independent, the correlation of the honest consensus
forecast with its error is negative, since the forecast tends to be too low when x exceeds µ
and too high when x is below µ.53 When all forecasters have equal precision and indepen-
dent errors, we see that f¯ converges almost surely to E[f |x] as n→∞ by the strong law
of large numbers. Thus, asymptotically the shocks relative to the consensus fi − f¯ have
the desirable zero-correlation properties.
6.3. Orthogonality
Consider linear forecasting rules of the form fi (si) = Fisi + (1− Fi)µ. We have already
noted that under honesty the forecast is uncorrelated with its error fi − x when Fi =
τ i/ (ν + τ i). More generally, the correlation is
E [(fi − x)fi] = E [(Fiεi + (1− Fi) (µ− x)) (Fi (x+ εi) + (1− Fi)µ)] = Fi
µ
Fi
τ i
− 1− Fi
ν
¶
,
and so has the same sign as Fi − τ i/ (τ i + ν). There is positive correlation when Fi is
larger as in the contest, and negative correlation when Fi is smaller as in the reputational
deviation. The reputational equilibrium forecast satisfies orthogonality but is not eﬃcient.
As noted above, all types of forecast had errors negatively correlated with the state
x. Thus, after knowing x the sign of the errors could be predicted. However, this is an
unreasonably strong test of the forecasters’ abilities since x is still unknown when the
forecasts are released. If they report honestly, their error cannot be predicted from the
forecast. The contest forecast and the reputational deviation forecast fail instead to inherit
this property, so that once a forecast has been released the sign of its error can be predicted.
A typical empirical test for the hypothesis that the forecasts are conditional expec-
tations (E[x|Ii] for some information set Ii) is based on regressing the realized forecast
error on the forecasts. Most studies report a positive correlation of the forecast and its
52An extensive literature in operations research studies the problem of how to optimally combine fore-
casts obtained with diﬀerent methods or incorporating diﬀerent information sets. See e.g. the early
contributions by Bates and Granger (1969) and Bunn (1975). That literature does not, however, consider
the possibility of strategic behavior by the forecasters.
53The weight that the conditional expectation E[x|s1, . . . , sn] = (νµ+τ1s1+· · ·+τnsn)/(ν+τ1+· · ·+τn)
attaches to si is τ i/τ j times the weight to sj . In the consensus forecast, the ratio of weights is instead
τ i(τ j + ν)/τ j (τ i + ν), so that too much weight is given to the least precise signals. Even when all
forecasters are equally precise, the weight accorded to the prior mean µ is too large and the consensus
forecast fails to inherit the orthogonality property from the individual forecasts. In this case the consensus
honest forecast is h¯ = (nνµ+ τ
Pn
i=1 si) / (nν + nτ) = (nνµ+ nτx+ τ
Pn
i=1 εi) / (nν + nτ) and the error
is h¯− x = (nν (µ− x) + τ
Pn
i=1 εi) / (nν + nτ), so that the covariance is always negative: E[h¯(h¯− x)] =
− (n− 1) τ/n (ν + τ)2 < 0 for n > 1. Kim, Lim and Shaw (1998) suggest methods to correct for the loss
of information in the consensus forecast.
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error, consistent with the prediction of our contest theory. For example, Batchelor and
Dua (1992) find that forecasters put too little weight on the forecasts previously released
by other forecasters (or, equivalently in our model, on the prior mean). However, Keane
and Runkle (1990, 1998) cannot support any bias, as they note that the tests are not as
powerful as is usually assumed once the correlation between forecast errors across fore-
casters is properly taken into account (see also Section 6.4 below). Recently, Zitzewitz
(2001a) has perfected the orthogonality methodology to test for the presence of herding
or exaggeration.54 Zitzewitz applies the test to I/B/E/S analysts and finds significant and
strong exaggeration.
6.4. Model Extension: Common Error
As stressed by Keane and Runkle (1998), the significant positive correlation among the
residuals in the orthogonality regression indicates the presence of a common error in the
forecasts. Since the forecasts are released well in advance, there are often unpredictable
changes to the variables after the forecasts are submitted.55 In this section we extend the
model to account for this correlation found in the data. We find that our results are robust
to the introduction of ex-post innovations in the state.
Suppose that each forecaster receives signal si = y + εi, that the variables y, ε1, . . . , εn
are stochastically independent as before, and that the state later observed is x = y + ε0.
Forecaster i observes si = x− ε0+ εi, so that the error ε0 plays the role of a common error
in the signals about the observed state x. We naturally assume that the the innovation is
unpredictable, i.e., ε0 ∼ N (0, 1/τ 0) is independent of y and the other errors. The honest
forecast of x is then the same as the honest forecast of y. Indeed, E[x|si] = E[y+ ε0|si] =
E[y|si] by the independence assumption. However, the posterior beliefs about x are less
precise than the posterior beliefs about y due to the added error term. The variance of
the normally distributed x|si is 1/ (τ i + ν) + 1/τ 0. Let q˜i (x|si) denote the p.d.f. of this
posterior belief.
54In our above theoretical derivation of the correlation of the forecast and its error, we treated the prior
mean µ as a parameter. Data analysis must control for the prior mean in order to correctly identify when a
realized state is “high” or “low.” Zitzewitz’ key innovation with respect to Keane and Runkle is to modify
the regression equation by subtracting the expectation containing all publicly available information at the
moment of forecasting from both the realization on the left hand side and the forecast on the right hand
side.
55In addition, often realizations are observed with noise. For example, national statistics data are revised
and become more accurate in later releases. In our model the evaluation of forecasters is based on one of
these realizations.
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Contest Theory. Let forecaster i conjecture that the opponents’ messages are distrib-
uted according to the conditional p.d.f. γ (c|x, si). His expected payoﬀ from forecast ci is
Ui(ci|si) = q˜i (x|si) /γ(ci|ci, si). Where we previously found that γ(ci|ci) peaked at µ, we
now derive that γ(ci|ci, si) peaks between µ and h (si). A value of si above µ suggests that
y > µ and therefore that the opponents will issue relatively high forecasts – relative to
the situation before, this moves up the state wherein the greatest mass of opponents guess
correctly. Extending the analysis of Section 4, an optimal reply to honesty still involves
exaggeration. Now there is no symmetric linear Nash equilibrium when τ/ν is large rela-
tive to τ 0/ν. In this case, the forecasters have poor information on the location of x, and
log (q˜i(ci|si)) is not very concave. Still, they have good information about y and about
the other forecasters’ signals, resulting in the convexity of log (γ(ci|ci, si)) being too large
when the other forecasters use best replies. When instead τ/ν is small relative to τ 0/ν,
there is a linear equilibrium with similar features to the one studied in the benchmark
model. We conclude that the results of Section 4 hold in the presence of enough ex-post
information about the state:
Proposition 7 In the forecasting contest with common error, there is exaggeration in the
best reply to honesty. If the noise in the common error is small enough, there exists a
pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium with exaggeration.
Reputational Theory. Since errors ε1, . . . , εn are correlated conditionally on x, in the
reputational model we must explictly consider the interaction of the n forecasters. In order
to update beliefs about the precision of forecaster i, the evaluator uses the information on
the location of y contained in the realized x as well as in the n forecasts. We find that the
results of Section 5 are robust to the addition of ex-post noise:
Proposition 8 In the reputational model with common error, the best reply to honesty
of any other fully separable strategy is conservative. There exists an equilibrium in which
every forecaster uses the binary reporting strategy of Proposition 5.
A forecaster with signal si = µ regards the two possible messages as symmetric, and is
thus indiﬀerent. A forecaster with signal si > µ thinks it more likely that other forecasters
report that they saw sj > µ, and thinks it more likely that the market observes x > µ –
alas forecaster i considers it more likely that the market’s posterior beliefs on y are shifted
upwards. Forecaster i then prefers to send the message that signals si > µ.
Since the evaluator does not have access to y, even honest revelation of si does not allow
for the calculation of the individual εi. The evaluator modifies the Bayesian procedure
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in this context, averaging over the possible values of y given the available information,
including the messages from the other forecasters. Recall that under a linear strategy
fi − E[fi|y] = Fiεi is proportional to the error and that in the case of many forecasters,
the consensus forecast provides a good approximation for E[fi|y]. A forecast close to the
consensus then indicates a small absolute value of εi and is therefore good news about the
forecaster’s ability.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have formulated and contrasted two distinct theories of strategic forecast-
ing within the normal model, widely used in information economics and empirical studies.
In the process we have gained some novel insights on the forces driving informed agents
to deviate from honest reporting of their conditional expectations. Mis-reporting results
from the eﬀect on individuals’ payoﬀ of the subtle interaction of the private information
available to each individual with the public prior information available to the market and
commonly shared by all agents.
Our first theory posits that competition for best accuracy takes place with pre-specified
rules. Since the forecasters share the same public information, competition is highest
when the state turns out to be equal to the prior mean. At the posterior expectation
a small deviation away from the prior mean results in a first-order gain due to reduced
competition and a second-order loss due to lower probability of winning. Equilibrium
forecasts in a winner-take-all contest are then excessively diﬀerentiated in comparison
with the corresponding conditional expectations. Note that the evaluation in a forecasting
contest is ex post optimal when the market can only observe the accuracy ranking. But
in reality the market has more information to evaluate the quality of forecasts.
Our second theory posits that the market has all the information contained in the
forecasts and the realization of the state and uses it to ex post optimally evaluate the
forecasters. We have assumed that better informed forecasters observe signals on average
closer to the state and that forecasters who are reputed to be better informed have a
higher payoﬀ. We have shown that forecasters wish to appear to have received a signal
equal to the posterior expectation of the state conditional on the signal actually received.
In the presence of public information, the observed signal is necessarily diﬀerent from the
posterior expectation. If the market naively believes that forecasters are honest, forecasters
then shade their forecasts toward the prior mean. If the market is fully aware of the
forecasters’ strategic incentives, equilibrium forecasts are imprecise but not shaded.56
56A possible criticism of our approach is that in reality competition among forecasters combines elements
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In both the contest and the reputational theory the incentive to deviate from honesty
is driven by the property that private signals are unimodally centered around the state
and the fact that public information is available at the moment of forecasting. In the
absence of public information, honest forecasting is an equilibrium in both models. In the
empirical literature, Zitzewitz (2001a) takes this public information into account and finds
significant and strong exaggeration in the forecasts of I/B/E/S analysts. This finding is
in line with the equilibrium of our forecasting contest, but inconsistent with the deviation
or the equilibrium of our reputational cheap talk model.57
Our results raise questions about the interpretation and use of professional forecasts
to test the predictions of theories on how agents’ decisions depend on expectations, as
done in financial, international, and macro economics.58 Further development of the the-
ory of strategic forecasting should lead to methods to adjust for the induced biases and
thus improve the interpretation of the results of econometric studies that use professional
forecasts as proxies of market expectations.59
While interesting phenomena emerge in simple and plausible models without the need
to depart from the rationality paradigm, there is some experimental evidence on devi-
ations from Bayesian rationality. For example, according to Kahneman and Tversky’s
(1973) representativeness bias, forecasters often disregard prior information when making
intuitive predictions. Experimental subjects put excessive weight on their signal and are
overconfident in their predictions, similarly to what happens in equilibrium of our forecast-
ing contest.60 More work needs to be done on building and testing behaviorally plausible
models of forecasting.61
In order to test the diﬀerent theories, it might be useful to compare non-anonymous
of both theories. For example, Institutional Investors ranks analysts based on the opinions of large
institutional investors. See Ottaviani and Sørensen (2003) for results on mixed incentives and relative
reputational concerns.
57As argued by Zitzewitz (2001b), the observed exaggeration is also consistent with an alternative
version of the reputational signaling model in which forecasters are privately informed about their ability
and are evaluated according to an econometric technique.
58See e.g., Frankel and Froot (1987) for a study of exchange rate expectations using surveys of profes-
sional forecasters.
59See e.g., Romer and Romer (2000) and Prati and Sbracia (2002).
60Our reputational theory only requires that the forecaster believes that the market perceives the under-
lying talents of forecasters to be heterogenous. In an early behavioral model of financial advice, Denton
(1985) assumes that investors listen to financial advisers who have no real information. In some cases,
this might well be the case. For example, Hartzmark (1991) found that futures forecasters depend on
luck rather than forecasting ability. Zitzewitz (2001a) instead finds that security analysts diﬀer greatly in
performance, justifying the assumption that they are fundamentally heterogeneous.
61See De Bondt and Thaler (1990) for arguments in favor of behavioral biases. It is worth remarking
that a behavioral bias can be reinforced by strategic incentives. Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) run an
early horse race between economic and psychological explanations for biases in forecasting.
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with anonymous forecasting surveys. The existence of anonymous surveys (starting in
1946 with the Livingston Survey) presupposes a belief that forecasters might not honestly
report their best predictions if anonymity were not preserved. While the identity of the
forecasters belonging to the panel is typically available, anonymous surveys do not reveal
which individual made which forecasts. A possible rationale for preserving anonymity is
that it can (but need not) guarantee honest forecasting.62
In this paper we have adopted a positive approach, leaving unanswered a number of
normative questions: How can forecasting surveys be improved to counteract the gaming
incentives? How do diﬀerent mechanisms aﬀect the forecasters’ incentives for information
acquisition?63
62As reported by Croushore (1993): “This anonymity is designed to encourage people to provide their
best forecasts, without fearing the consequences of making forecasts errors. In this way, an economist can
feel comfortable in forecasting what she really believes will happen [...]. The negative side of providing
anonymity, of course, is that forecasters can’t claim credit for particularly good forecast performance,
nor can they be held accountable for particularly bad forecasts. Some economists feel that without
accountability, forecasters may make less accurate predictions because there are fewer consequences to
making poor forecasts.” A problem with the hypothesis of honest forecasting in perfectly anonymous
surveys is that we do not have a theory to predict behavior in this situation. There is no clear objective.
Possibly, the forecasters are concerned that the survey editor discovers something about their behavior,
partly undermining the survey anonymity. In fact, as we were told by Croushore and Lamont, forecasters
often seem to submit to the anonymous surveys the same forecasts they have already prepared for public
(i.e. non-anonymous) release.
63Combining the insights of the statistical literature on scoring rules with the economic theory of reg-
ulation, Osband (1989) studies the optimal provision of forecasting incentives in the presence of costly
information acquisition. See also Prendergast (1993).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Recall that x|si is normal with mean (τsi+νµ)/(τ+ν) and
precision τ + ν. Suppose that all opponents use the linear strategy c (s) = As+(1−A)µ,
with A ∈ (0, 1]. Then c|x is normal with E[c|x] = Ax + (1−A)µ and V [c|x] = A2/τ .
Disregarding an irrelevant constant term, we find
log (γ(c|c)) = −τ (c− (Ac+ (1−A)µ))
2
2A2
= −τ (1−A)
2 (c− µ)2
2A2
,
a concave quadratic function of c with peak at µ. The forecaster maximizes log (qi(ci|si))−
log (γ(ci|ci)), the diﬀerence of two concave quadratic functions. The objective function is
concave when the first concave term prevails, i.e. for τ + ν > τ (1−A)2 /A2.
When τ + ν > τ (1−A)2 /A2, the forecaster has a unique best reply ci = Bsi +
(1−B)µ, with B = τ/
¡
τ + ν − τ (1−A)2 /A2
¢
∈ [τ/ (τ + ν) ,+∞). When instead τ +
ν < τ (1−A)2 /A2, there is no best response because the incentive to move away from
µ is so strong that forecaster i wishes to go to the extremes ±∞. In the knife-edge case
τ + ν = τ (1−A)2 /A2 the objective function is linear – whenever si 6= µ there is again
no best reply, as the forecaster wishes to go to one of the extremes.
In particular, in the honest case A = τ/ (τ + ν), it is optimal to reply with B =
τ 2/ (τ 2 + τν − ν2), provided that ν/τ <
¡
1 +
√
5
¢
/2. We conclude that the best reply
against truthtelling by all the opponents is to exaggerate. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. C = 0 is not compatible with a symmetric equilibrium since
in this case the opponents’ forecasts are all equal to c = µ so that all replies other than µ
yield forecaster i higher payoﬀ. Assume then that the forecasters use linear strategies of
the form c(s) = Cs + (1− C)µ with C ∈ (0, 1]. As shown in the proof of Proposition 1,
forecaster i has as best reply a linear strategy with weight τ/
¡
τ + ν − τ (1− C)2 /C2
¢
on the signal, provided that τ + ν > τ (1− C)2 /C2. The fixed-point condition for a
symmetric Nash equilibrium is that this linear strategy be equal to the one posited,
or (1− C) τ = C2ν. Insert the values C = 0, τ/ (τ + ν) , 1 in this quadratic equa-
tion to conclude that it possesses only one positive solution, and that this solution is
in (τ/ (τ + ν) , 1). The second-order condition for the forecaster’s optimization requires
τ + ν > τ (1− C)2 /C2. Using (1− C) τ = C2ν, this condition reduces to τ > −νC,
clearly satisfied by the positive solution for C. Finally, the solution of the quadratic
equation is C =
¡√
τ 2 + 4ντ − τ
¢
/2ν. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. Observingm = h (s) and x, the evaluator infers the realized
signal sˆ = h−1 (m) and error εˆ = sˆ − x. The updated reputation is then p (t|m,x) =
g˜ (sˆ|x, t) p (t) /g (sˆ|x). This posterior reputation satisfies two intuitive properties due to
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the assumptions on g˜. First, the posterior reputation depends on m and x only through
the absolute size of the error |εˆ|. Second, a small realized absolute error is good news
about the forecaster’s talent: for any t < t0, the likelihood ratio p (t|m,x) /p (t0|m,x) =
(g˜ (sˆ|x, t) /g˜ (sˆ|x, t0)) (p (t) /p (t0)) is increasing in |εˆ|. These two properties imply (see
Milgrom (1981)) that W (m|x) is a strictly decreasing function of the inferred absolute
error |εˆ|.
Consider now the best response of a forecaster with signal s. The posterior distribution
on x is normal with mean h (s) and variance 1/ (ν + τ). The inferred forecast error εˆ =
h−1 (m)−x is then normally distributed with mean h−1 (m)−h (s) and variance 1/ (ν + τ).
The best reply maximizes the expected value ofW , or equivalently minimizes a symmetric
loss function of the error h−1 (m)− x. The forecaster then chooses m such that the error
has mean zero, by setting h−1 (m) = h (s). ¤
Lemma 1 If a p.d.f. gˆ (.) satisfies the property
gˆ (t0ε) gˆ (tε0) < gˆ (tε) gˆ (t0ε0) for ε0 > ε ≥ 0 and t0 > t, (7.1)
its counter-cumulative distribution satisfies it as well:h
1− Gˆ (t0ε)
i h
1− Gˆ (tε0)
i
<
h
1− Gˆ (tε)
i h
1− Gˆ (t0ε0)
i
for ε0 > ε ≥ 0 and t0 > t. (7.2)
Proof. Integrating (7.1) for ε00 > ε0, we get
t0gˆ (t0ε)
h
1− Gˆ (tε0)
i
< tgˆ (tε)
h
1− Gˆ (t0ε0)
i
(7.3)
for ε0 > ε. Notice that the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (7.2) are equal for
ε0 = ε, and that by (7.3) we know that the derivative of the left-hand side is larger than
the derivative of the right-hand side of (7.2). We conclude that (7.2) holds. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5. To support this equilibrium, we also need to specify the
evaluator’s beliefs following out-of-equilibrium messages. When receiving any message
diﬀerent from mL and mH , the evaluator assumes that the forecaster possessed a signal
below the threshold, thereby resulting in the same posterior reputation as message mL.
These beliefs satisfy the requirements of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Assume that the evaluator conjectures a binary strategy with threshold signal sˇ. We
find ϕ (mH |x, t) =
R∞
sˇ g˜ (s|x, t) ds =
R∞
sˇ tgˆ (t|s−x|) /2ds. This reduces to (1−Gˆ(t|sˇ−x|))/2
when sˇ > x and (1 + Gˆ(t|sˇ − x|))/2 when sˇ < x, where Gˆ is the c.d.f. corresponding to
the p.d.f. gˆ. Therefore, ϕ (mH |x, t) = 1−ϕ (mH |2sˇ− x, t) = ϕ (mL|2sˇ− x, t). From (5.1),
this implies the symmetry property W (mH |x) =W (mL|2sˇ− x).
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When sˇ > x, it follows from Lemma 1 that message mH is worse news about the
talent than the observation that s ≥ x. Thus we have W (mH |x) < W (mH |sˇ) for x < sˇ.
Symmetrically, W (mH |x) > W (mH |sˇ) for x > sˇ. These inequalities and symmetry imply
that W (mH |x) > W (mL|x) for x > sˇ.
We now show that when sˇ = µ, the forecaster does not wish to deviate from the
putative equilibrium strategy. By symmetry, it suﬃces to assume that s ≥ µ and check
that U (mH |s) ≥ U (mL|s). Using (5.2) and symmetry of W , U (mH |s)− U (mL|s) isZ ∞
−∞
(W (mH |x)−W (mL|x)) q (x|s) dx =
Z ∞
µ
(W (mH |x)−W (mL|x)) (q (x|s)−q (2µ−x|s)) dx.
Since q (x|s) is the p.d.f. of the symmetric normal distribution with a mean weakly above
µ, we have q (x|s) ≥ q (2µ− x|s) when x ≥ µ. We already had W (mH |x) > W (mL|x)
when x > µ, so the integrand of the last integral is everywhere non-negative, implying
that the integral is non-negative, i.e. that U (mH |s) ≥ U (mL|s) as desired.
Finally, we show that when sˇ 6= µ, the forecaster wishes to deviate from the binary
strategy. Without loss of generality, focus on the case sˇ > µ. We show that there ex-
ists a signal s > sˇ such that U (mH |s) < U (mL|s). As above, U (mH |s)−U (mL|s) =R∞
sˇ (W (mH |x)−W (mL|x)) (q (x|s)−q (2sˇ−x|s)) dx. We have againW (mH |x) > W (mH |sˇ)
for x > sˇ. At x = sˇ we have q (x|s) = q (2sˇ− x|s). By properties of the normal p.d.f., we
obtain q (x|s) < q (2sˇ− x|s) for x > sˇ provided E[x|s] = (τs+ νµ) / (τ + ν) < sˇ, which is
certainly true for s slightly greater than sˇ. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6. By applying the well-known result that E[y|y > 0] =
σ
p
2/π for a normal variable y ∼ N(0, σ2) (cf. Johnson and Kotz (1970)), we see that
mH = E[x|s ≥ µ] is equal to E[E[x|s]|s ≥ µ] = E[ τs+νµτ+ν |s ≥ µ] = µ+ ττ+νE [s− µ|s > µ] =
µ +
p
2τ/ (πν (τ + ν)). By symmetry, we have mL = µ −
p
2τ/ (πν (τ + ν)). Given
x, the chance of the forecast r taking the high value mH is 1 − Φ (
√
τ (µ− x)) where
Φ is the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. The binomial distribution of r
has mean E[r|x] = µ + (1 − 2Φ (√τ (µ− x)))p2τ/ (πν (τ + ν)) and variance V [r|x] =
4 (1− Φ (
√
τ (µ− x)))Φ (
√
τ (µ− x)) 2τ/ (πν (τ + ν)). For any x, we haveΦ (
√
τ (µ− x)) ∈
[0, 1] so 4 (1− Φ (
√
τ (µ− x)))Φ (
√
τ (µ− x)) ≤ 1, where the bound is tight being achieved
for x = µ. We conclude that V [r|x] ≤ 2τ/ (πν (τ + ν)). Finally, insert ρ = τ/ν. ¤
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Omissible Proofs
Proof of Proposition 7. Assume that the opponents use a linear strategy mˆ (s) =
Cs + (1 − C)µ where C ∈ (0, 1]. The hypothetical observation of x = ci and of sig-
nal si gives two independent sources of information about y. Updating normal beliefs
as usual, we find y|ci, si ∼ N ((νµ+ τ 0ci + τsi) / (ν + τ 0 + τ) , 1/ (ν + τ 0 + τ)). Condi-
tionally on x = ci and si, the message mˆ (sj) = Cy + Cεj + (1− C)µ is then nor-
mally distributed with mean C (νµ+ τ 0ci + τsi) / (ν + τ 0 + τ) + (1 − C)µ and variance
C2 (ν + τ 0 + 2τ) / ((ν + τ 0 + τ) τ). This gives the mass of correct opponent guesses,
γ(ci|ci, si) =
q
(ν+τ0+τ)τ
(ν+τ0+2τ)C22π exp
µ
− (ν+(1−C)τ0+τ)
2τ
2(ν+τ0+2τ)(ν+τ0+τ)C2
³
ci − (ν+(1−C)(τ0+τ))µ+Cτsiν+(1−C)τ0+τ
´2¶
.
Clearly, γ(ci|ci, si) is centered between µ and si. Nevertheless, when C < 1 this center
remains closer to µ than the honest estimate h (si) since the weight on si is smaller:
Cτ/ (ν + (1− C) τ 0 + τ) < τ/ (τ + ν). Provided there exists a best response, this response
is therefore biased away from µ, by the same logic as before.
Recall that x|si ∼ N ((νµ+ τsi) / (ν + τ) , (ν + τ0 + τ) / ((ν + τ) τ 0)). This objective
function log (Ui(ci|si)) = log (qi (ci|si))− log (γ(ci|ci, si)) is quadratic in the choice variable
ci. The first order condition characterizing the unique maximizer is
(ν+(1−C)τ0+τ)2τ
(ν+τ0+2τ)C2
³
ci − (ν+(1−C)(τ0+τ))µ+Cτsiν+(1−C)τ0+τ
´
= τ 0 (ν + τ)
¡
ci − νµ+τsiν+τ
¢
.
Gathering terms, this can be rewritten as ci = Ksi + (1−K)µ. The equilibrium fixed
point condition requires that the weight on si should be C, i.e.
τ 0 (ν + τ) (ν + τ 0 + 2τ)C
2− (ν + (1− C) τ 0 + τ)2 τ
= τ (τ 0 (ν + τ 0 + 2τ)C − (ν + (1− C) τ 0 + τ) τ) .
This quadratic equation in C can be easily solved. The total coeﬃcient on C2 on the left
hand side is positive. At C = 0, the right hand side exceeds the left hand side. At C = 1
the opposite is true. The unique solution C ∈ (0, 1) defines an equilibrium, if it satisfies
the second order condition. The second order condition requires positivity of the left hand
side, or equivalently of the right hand side, i.e. C > τ (ν + τ 0 + τ) / (τ 0 (ν + τ 0 + 3τ)).
This condition can be checked by inserting τ (ν + τ 0 + τ) / (τ 0 (ν + τ 0 + 3τ)) for C in the
fixed point equation and verifying that the right hand side exceeds the left hand side. This
criterion for equilibrium existence is then
(ν + τ) (ν + τ 0 + 2τ)
τ2(ν+τ0+τ)2
τ0(ν+τ0+3τ)2
−
³
(ν+τ0+τ)(ν+τ0+2τ)
ν+τ0+3τ
´2
τ
< τ
³
(ν + τ 0 + 2τ)
τ(ν+τ0+τ)
(ν+τ0+3τ) −
³
(ν+τ0+τ)(ν+τ0+2τ)
ν+τ0+3τ
´
τ
´
.
For small τ 0 this fails since (ν + τ)
3 (ν + 2τ) τ 2/ (ν + 3τ)2 > 0. For large τ 0 it holds since
the coeﬃcient on τ 20 is −τ < 0. ¤
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Proof of Proposition 8. First, assume that all opponents j 6= i use a fully separating
strategy. Besides the forecast of forecaster i, the evaluator observes n independent signals
about y, namely every sj where j 6= i and x. From the well-known updating of beliefs
on a normal state, this is equivalent to the observation of just one more precise signal
about y. So, without loss of generality, we can imagine that x itself contains all the
evaluator’s external information on y. Since x = y + ε0 where ε0 is independent of εi and
ti, y is a suﬃcient statistic for x and the law of iterated expectations gives pi (ti|mi, x) =
E [pi (ti|mi, y) |x]. Observe then that
Ui (mi|si) =
Z ∞
−∞
·Z ∞
0
u(t)pi(ti|mi, x) dt
¸
qi(x|si) dx
=
Z ∞
−∞
·Z ∞
0
u(t)
Z ∞
−∞
pi(ti|mi, y)q(y|x) dy dt
¸
qi(x|si) dx
=
Z ∞
−∞
·Z ∞
0
u(t)pi(ti|mi, y) dt
¸ ·Z ∞
−∞
q(y|x)qi(x|si) dx
¸
dy.
This resembles the original expression for Ui (mi|si), except that the old qi (y|si) has
been replaced by the average
R∞
−∞ q(y|x)qi(x|si) dx of the evaluator’s beliefs. Both q(y|x)
and qi(x|si) are normal p.d.f.s, and their product can be rewritten as A0 exp(−A1(x −
A2 (y, si))
2 − A3 (y −A4 (si))2) where A0, A1, A3 are constants not depending on x, y, si,
the constant A2 depends on y, si only, and A4 (si) = [τ 0τ isi + (ν + τ 0 + τ i) νµ]/[τ 0τ i +
(ν + τ 0 + τ i) ν]. We then find
R∞
−∞ q(y|x)qi(x|si) dx = A5 exp
¡
−A3 (y −A4 (si))2
¢
where
A5 is independent of y, si since the normalizing constant of a normal p.d.f. does not involve
the mean. We conclude that the forecaster’s objective function is of the same form as pre-
viously, where
R∞
−∞ q(y|x)qi(x|si) dx is a normal p.d.f. with mean A4 (si) strictly between
µ and si. As in Proposition 3, forecaster i will deviate from a fully separating strategy mi
by issuing mi (A4 (si)) 6= mi (si) for any si 6= µ.
Second, assume that all the opponents apply the binary strategy with threshold µ.
We use again that Ui (mi|si) = E [Wi (mi|y)E [q(y|x,m−i)|si]] as derived above, where
Wi (mi|y) is precisely the same as in the proof of Proposition 5. That proof carries over
to this new situation, once we verify that E [q(y|x,m−i)|si] ≥ E [q(2µ− y|x,m−i)|si] when
y ≥ µ and si ≥ µ. Using symmetry of q(y|x,m−i), we have
E [q(y|x,m−i)|si]− E [q(2µ− y|x,m−i)|si]
=
Z ∞
−∞
X
M−i
[(q(y|x,m−i)− q(2µ− y|x,m−i)) qi (x,m−i|si)] dx
=
Z ∞
µ
X
M−i
£
(q(y|x,m−i)− q(2µ− y|x,m−i))
¡
qi (x,m−i|si)− qi
¡
2µ− x,mc−i|si
¢¢¤
dx
where M−i = {mL,mH}n−1 and mc−i denotes the vector of messages opposite to m−i,
i.e. in which every mH is replaced by mL and vice versa. First, when y ≥ µ and
x ≥ µ, for any m−i, q(y|x,m−i) ≥ q(2µ − y|x,m−i) since x is closer to y than to
2µ − y. This implies that
R∞
µ
P
M−i [q(y|x,m−i) − q(2µ − y|x,m−i)]dx ≥ 0. Second,
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R∞
µ
P
M−i
£
qi (x,m−i|si)− qi
¡
2µ− x,mc−i|si
¢¤
dx = Pr(x ≥ µ|si)− Pr (x ≤ µ|si) ≥ 0 since
si ≥ µ. Finally, the result that E [q(y|x,m−i)|si] ≥ E[q(2µ− y|x,m−i)|si] follows from the
positive correlation of q(y|x,m−i)−q(2µ−y|x,m−i) with qi(x,m−i|si)−qi(2µ−x,mc−i|si).
This is due to the fact that when si, x, y ≥ µ, every opponent’s message mH is believed
more frequent than mL, and every opponent’s message mH gives greater q(y|x,m−i) and
smaller q(2µ− y|x,m−i) than message mL. ¤
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